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10
B contains the authorizing and funding resolutions for the investigation. Appendix
B consists of a number of the documents cited in the text.
Also available, but published separately from this final report and appendixes,
are the transcripts of subcommittee hearings and documents submitted for the
record. A list of these and other key congressional reports is contained in
appendix C.¹
Several matters concerning the content of the final report should be noted.
Confidentiality of sources. --The findings were derived from extensive review
of documents and numerous interviews. Much of the material was classified;
many of the persons interviewed requested anonymity. Where the subcommittee
was unable to cite a specific source for the reason, the footnote reads "classified
material" or "subcommittee staff interview." In most instances, information was
verified by other sources so that it has been possible to provide at least one
specific reference.
Korean names.--For the most part, Korean names have been romanized
according to the spelling used by the person. Korean custom is to put the family
name first, with given names following. The subcommittee followed this practice
except in the cases of well-known persons such as Tongsun Park, Sun Myung
Moon, and Hancho Kim, where the order is reversed to the usual English order.
Documents in Korean.--A number of the documents reviewed by the
subcommittee were in the Korean language. They were translated either by staff
investigators Edward J. Baker and Edwin H. Gragert or other experts.
The subcommittee extends special thanks to the following executive branch
agencies for their valuable cooperation: the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Department of State, the Agency for International Development,
and the Department of Agriculture. The subcommittee noted separately its
appreciation of the extensive help it received from elements of the intelligence
community. Also, the subcommittee is deeply grateful to the hundreds of private
individuals whose voluntary assistance was of crucial importance.
(1) Because of the numerous references to subcommittee hearings and
certain other key congressional reports, their full citations have been abbreviated
after the first reference. Abbreviations are noted at the first reference and at the
end of the glossary
311
The 1976 plan proposed the use of anti-Communist groups such as the
Freedom Leadership Foundation
222
and Accuracy in Media (AIM) to discredit
organizations and individuals felt to be "pro-North" in the Korean-American
community.
223
An early example of this occurred in 1971. Freedom Leadership
Foundation used its publication, The Rising Tide, to discredit a Korean-American
scholar in the same manner as proposed in the Plan. The article in The Rising
Tide specifically referred to the scholar as "pro-communist" and suggested that
he was a danger to U.S. security. (224)
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