33
International Seafood Co. The 1978 annual report filed with Virginia authorities
listed the officers and directors of International Oceanic Enterprises as follows.
(321)
Bo Hi Pak, president; Won Dae Chi, vice-president; Judy LeJeune, secretary;
Irene Cooney, assistant secretary; and Bonnie J. Prechtl, assistant treasurer.
The directors were:
Bo Hi Pak; Sun Myung Moon; Neil A. Salonen; Mose Durst; Michael Young
Warder; Takeru Kamiyama; and Joseph Sheftick.
Moon and Pak provided the initial capital through the UCI account at the
DNB; later infusions of cash from UCI totaled millions of dollars. Among the
disbursements made by the seafood business in its early months was $200,000
to Tong I1 Enterprises on December 27, 1976. (322)
These transactions again illustrate how the components of the Moon
Organization work together as an economic unit. In the 7 month period from
October 1976 to May 1977, nearly $1 million was poured into the fishing
business from other Moon enterprises. The transfers from UCI were particularly
illustrative since Moon--who signed the checks--and Pak Bo Hi held positions in
both UCI and International Oceanic Enterprises, and Pak was president of both
organizations. The transfer from the seafood company to Tong Il Enterprises in
New York similarly involved taking money from one Moon Organization pocket
and putting it into another.
In 1977, the fishing interests expanded with the purchase of 700 acres of
waterfront property in Alabama reportedly for a fishery and ship building industry.
Part of the down payment was $400,000 provided by International Seafood's
account in Norfolk. (323)
332
By 1978, UCI money was also being put into other businesses and holding
companies, such as One Up Corporation, U.S. Marine Corp., U.S. Foods, and Il
Hwa American Corp. (324)
Issues Revealed by the Investigation
As the investigation proceeded, certain patterns emerged. The various units
of what came to be called the Moon Organization had overlapping directors and
officers and used personnel interchangeably. They were tied to one another
through joint activities, financing, and mutual use of projects. They were involved
to varying degrees with the Korean Government. They carried out activities,
especially political and anti-Communist ones, that conflicted with the purposes
set forth in their corporate charters. Furthermore, several of these activities were
in apparent violation of U.S. tax-exempt and nonprofit corporation laws, as well
as U.S. immigration laws and those governing the international movement of cur-