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55
and have to be explained to UC members. This was true with respect to the
planned demonstration at the Japanese Embassy, for example, which was both
begun and halted in response to orders from KCIA headquarters in Seoul. Moon
saw risks in mobilizing his organization to support the Korean position on this
occasion, but justified it in terms of service to Korea:
"I ordered my organization to do certain things. I told the leaders that,
because of this particular action maybe the Unification Church movement will
suffer a setback. But, even though we suffer a setback, we must mobilize our
forces to unite behind Korea in the critical moment. We must support the position
of Korea." (425)
On other occasions, the Moon Organization has undertaken activities of
service to the Korean Government, or as its agent, which were also of clear
economic or political benefit to the organization and did not present as much risk
of public opposition. An example was the unpublicized effort by Tong I1
Industries to negotiate an extension of the M-16 coproduction agreement
between Colt Industries and the ROK Government and to obtain Colt's
agreement to allow experts of M-16's to third countries. (426)
Other examples
are: the joint Moon Organization-ROK Government support and sponsorship of
the Little Angels (427) and many of the Moon Organization's anti-Communist
activities. As part of its Victory over Communism program, for example, the Moon
Organization established an anti-Communist training center at Sootaek-Ri, near
Seoul. Here anti-Communist indoctrination courses were given to Korean Gov-
ernment officials. (428)
The Moon Organization was affected by shifts among various factions within
the Korean Government; this paralleled the experience of other individuals and
groups engaged in pro-ROK activities. Tongsun Park, for example, was bitterly
opposed by the Korean Ambassador to the U.S. and others in the Korean
Government, but he and his supporters in the Government prevailed. As noted
earlier, it was reported that the KCIA station chief in Washington had opposed
the Moon Organization over the U.N. activities, but the KCIA director in Seoul
ordered him to cease his opposition and cooperate with Moon. Other reports
stated that Moon's allies within the Ministry of National Defense had, by 1976,
helped make a Moon Organization industry a leading defense contractor.
However, later in 1976 and in early 1977, when there was much negative
publicity surrounding Moon and his possible connection to the Korean lobbying
activities, the Government apparently reacted by canceling the passports of the
Little Angels and by charging Il Hwa officers with tax evasion. These actions
were later cited by
353
ROK and Moon Organization spokesmen as proof that there was no connection
between Moon and the Government. (429)
In numerous speeches and internal publications, Moon and his top
lieutenants have claimed to have close ties with the Korean Government. In a
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