71
by the Korean Government when the Korean defense industry began its build-up
in the late 1960's and early 1970's. His information was based on conversations
with high-ranking Korean Defense Ministry officials. Documents in possession of
the subcommittee indicated that Kim had been privy to confidential details about
Korean defense production. (538)
There was strong evidence that--through Tong Il Industries--the Moon
Organization was involved in the production of M-16's and other weapons.
However, at the end of the investigation there were unanswered questions about
how Tong Il had become involved in M-16 production. The U.S. Government-
approved coproduction agreement was concluded between Colt and the ROK
Government, which was to be the sole producer of M-16's. A Colt official who
supervised the construction of the ROK Government's production facilities for M-
16's said that the Government-owned plant was capable of manufacturing all
parts of the gun, thereby requiring no subcontractors.
With respect to exports of M-16's, Tong II's attempt to get Colt's permission
was apparently done with ROK Government knowledge and approval, although it
was equally apparent that neither the ROK Government nor the Moon
Organization wanted to admit Tong II's involvement or the ROK Government's
interest in exporting the guns. U.S. policy has consistently opposed such exports.
As noted elsewhere, (539) the subcommittee received information that M-16's
and other weapons had been exported or that exports had been attempted in
possible violation of the Arms Export Control Act. Because of this information and
because of the strange
369
circumstances surrounding Tong II's communications with Colt, the
Subcommittee has referred its findings to appropriate congressional committees
and executive branch agencies, with the request that they press for further
details concerning Tong I1's role in armaments production. (540)
Other ties to the ROK Government
In the 1976 KCIA Plan for Operations in the U.S., (541)
the FLF was
mentioned in two places as an organization to be used to achieve KCIA
objectives. In one section of the plan, it was to be used to counter activities of
pro-North Korean organizations and individuals in the United States:
3. Absolute prevention of a 2nd chosorenization (542) of the Korean
Residents in America;
--Increasingly implant operatives in the underground organization of pro-North
and Anti-government Korean residents;
--Detect plans, search out the organization, block and destroy their
operations;
--Disintegration of Pro-Northern Puppet organization within the U.S.;
--Utilize anti-communist groups--FLF, AIM, etc. (543)