THE ASSASSINATION OF REPRESENTATIVE LEO J. RYAN
AND THE JONESTOWN, GUYANA TRAGEDY

Excerpt from: REPORT OF A STAFF INVESTIGATIVE GROUP TO THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS  U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MAY 15, 1979

D. Awareness of Danger; Predicting the Degree of Violence

One area on which this inquiry concentrated under Chairman Zablocki's  mandate dealt with the questions of whether (a) Representative Ryan had been adequately advised of the potential for danger, and (b) how accurately anyone could have predicted the degree of violence employed (for further elaboration, see Appendix 111-D in classified version only). On the basis of evidence gathered we, have reached conclusions on both counts:

-Representative Ryan was advised on more than one occasion of the possibility of violence inherent in his trip to Jonestown.  However, he tended to discount such warnings with the thought that his office as a Congressman would protect him. Moreover, he was apparently willing to face whatever danger might be present, citing as a reason his own previous investigative experiences and his determination not to be influenced by fear.

-The warnings Mr. Ryan did receive regarding the prospect for violence came chiefly from his own staff and the Concerned Relatives group. When the issue was raised in the State Department briefings prior to the trip, Mr. Ryan did not challenge State's assessment that potential danger was "unlikely." In fact, State's briefings for the Ryan Codel dwelled almost exclusively on the legal problems relative to the trip as well as the logistical difficulties involved in reaching the remote and isolated jungle compound.

-No one interviewed by the Staff Investigative Group ever anticipated the degree of violence actually encountered. Many expected that there might be adversarial encounters, arguments, or shouting; the worst anticipated was that someone might "get punched in the mouth."

-From a variety of sources, Representative Ryan and some representatives of the media were cautioned that they were regarded as adversaries of People's Temple and Jones. They were further informed that Jones was paranoid. It is appropriate to note here that Mr. Ryan apparently did not advise anyone in the State Department or the U.S. Embassy in Guyana that one of the purposes of his trip was to help possible defectors leave Jonestown with him on November 19.

-Some members of Mr. Ryan's staff as well as the media group had gut feelings on the, possibility for violence. They ranged from advising Mr. Ryan that Jones had a "capacity" for violence, to a general concern based on allegations of guns in Jonestown, and finally, to the thought that a bomb might be placed on the plane on which the entire party flew to Guyana. At the most extreme end of such intuitive hunches and feelings was Miss Jackie Speier's  premonition of fear that led her to write her own will.

-To the extent that violence was considered a possibility by the Ryan Codel, there is evidence to suggest that Mr. Ryan may have looked on the accompanying media group as a "shield"; conversely, to the extent there was any apprehension in their ranks, the media regarded Mr. Ryan's status as a Congressman as their best protection. For other members of the media, the principal potential danger considered was the jungle against which they protected themselves by taking special supplies.

E. U.S Customs Service Investigation

One key element relating to the question of whether the Ryan Codel had adequate awareness of the potential for danger as well as the degree of violence which ultimately ensued involves a 1977 U.S. Customs Service investigation of reported illegal gun shipments and other contraband to Jonestown (see Appendix III-E, in classified version only). In the course of this inquiry, therefore, the Staff Investigative Group obtained evidence which warrants the following findings on the subject:

-Working on allegations interspersed amid many "bizarre" tales about People's Temple, the investigation was begun in February 1977. One of the allegations contended that more than 170 weapons once stored in Ukiah had been transferred to People's Temple San Francisco headquarters and then possibly on to Jonestown.

-The investigation was compromised 1 month after it began, not through any inadvertence on the part of the Customs Service, but when an individual conveyed some information on the matter to Dennis Banks, head of the American Indian Movement, in an effort to dissuade Banks from any further contact with Jones. That conversation was apparently taped and word was passed to Jones. Complete details of the investigation's report were further compromised when a copy of the report was sent to Interpol. From Interpol it was, by normal procedure, shared with the Guyanese police. According to information provided us, Guyanese Police Commissioner C. A. "Skip" Roberts reportedly showed a copy to either Paula Adams or Carolyn Layton, two of Mr. Jones' trusted aides, one of whom passed the information to Mr. Jones.

-Although the Customs Service investigation was not diluted or diminished in any way, it is clear that it was carried out in an unusually -sensitive mode because of what was perceived to be Jim Jones' considerable political influence in San Francisco. Surveillance relating to the investigation was virtually impossible to carry out because of the tight security screen Jones placed around the Geary Street headquarters of People's Temple in San Francisco.

-The investigation was concluded in August-September 1977 after a shipment of crates destined for Jonestown was opened and inspected by the Customs Service in Miami in August 1977. Shortly thereafter a report on the investigation was filed with negative results. Nonetheless, investigators apparently felt enough residual suspicion to send copies of the report to Interpol and the U.S. Department of State "because (the) investigation disclosed allegations that Jones intends to establish a political power base in Guyana, and that he may currently. have several hundred firearms in that country * * *."

-The copy of the Customs Service report was received in the State Department's Office of Munitions Control on September 1, 1977 and on September 6, 1977 a copy was forwarded to the Department's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. Although standard routing procedures provided that a copy should have been sent to the U.S. Embassy in Guyana there is no indication a copy ever was sent. In addition, only the Guyana desk officer saw the report; none of the more than 26 State Department officials we interviewed saw the report until after November 18, 1978, although one professed "awareness" of it earlier.

F. Conspiracy To Kill Representative Ryan?

Relative to the likelihood of a People's Temple-Jim Jones conspiracy to kill Representative Ryan, the Staff Investigative Group has reached the following conclusions based on evidence available to us (for further elaboration see Appendix 111-F in classified version only) :

-The possibility of any prior conspiracy tends to be diminished by the fact that Gordon Lindsay, a reporter whom Mr. Jones regarded as an arch enemy of People's Temple, was not allowed to enter Jonestown with the Ryan party.

-Still not to be, discounted entirely, however, is the possible existence of a contingency conspiracy. In this connection, there are reports of an "understanding" in Jonestown that if efforts to delude Ryan as to the true conditions at Jonestown failed he would have to be killed, supposedly by arranging for his plane to crash in the jungle after leaving Jonestown. While circumstantial evidence is available on this theory we have not found any hard evidence.

-Providing some moderate credence to the idea of a contingency conspiracy is the fact that the Jonestown mass suicide/murder ritual started before the Port Kaituma assailants returned to confirm the shootings of Representative Ryan and others.

-Also lending some substance to the contingency conspiracy theory are unconfirmed reports that a large shipment of cyanide, used in the mass suicide/murder, arrived in Jonestown 2 days before Ryan's visit. Also related is the reported statement of a Jonestown survivor that several days before Mr. Ryan arrived in Jonestown he heard Jones say that the Congressman's plane "might fall from the sky."

-In an effort to obtain detailed information on Mr. Ryan's upcoming trip, Jones placed a phony defector within the ranks of the Concerned Relatives group in San Francisco 1 month before the Codel's departure for Guyana. The "defector" was seen back in Jonestown when the Ryan party arrived. The late awareness that the defector was false, produced a heightened sense of danger in the minds of some making the trip.

G. The Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act

Throughout this investigation there were repeated references made as to the pervasive role of the Privacy Act and, to a lesser degree, the Freedom of Information Act in the tragedy at Jonestown. The Staff Investigative Group made a careful and thorough review of the issue which resulted in the following findings (for further elaboration, see Appendix III-G-1 in classified version only):

-The Privacy Act figured prominently in several important aspects of the State Department's and U.S. Embassy's briefings and relations with the Ryan Codel and their handling of matters relating to People's Temple.

-Officials within both the State Department and the Embassy clearly tended to confuse the Privacy Act with the Freedom of Information Act, thereby inhibiting the comprehensiveness of written reports and exchanges of information. One key Embassy official, for instance, was operating under the mistaken assumption that People's Temple was seeking cables reporting on consular visits to Jonestown under provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.

-Representative Ryan's legal advisers contended that the State Department's interpretation of the Privacy Act was unreasonably narrow  and restrictive, and further felt that fact had ramifications on what the Codel wished to accomplish. Those differences, which began in Washington and continued in Guyana, resulted in somewhat strained relations between the State Department and the Codel.

-The State Department's interpretation of the Privacy Act led them to deny Ryan access to certain information and documents relative to People's Temple. That problem could have been avoided or at least alleviated if Mr. Ryan had followed the Department's advice to obtain a letter from the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs authorizing him such access under an exemption clause in the act. That exemption provision permits disclosure to any committee of Congress "to the extent of matter within its jurisdiction." Reflecting the State Department's lack of knowledge of the law and its application, it is pertinent to note that on February 28, 1979, the State Department was unaware of the exemption provision in denying to Chairman Zablocki requested information germane to the investigation. (See Appendix III-Q-G-2.)

-Prior to the Codel's departure, the U.S. Embassy in Guyana reflected its own acute sensitivity regarding the Privacy Act by urging that Mr. Ryan be fully informed of the act's limitations. That sensitivity was reinforced by the Embassy's request that a Department legal expert accompany the Codel, a request denied by State because of travel freeze, restrictions and the heavy press of other work.

-Among the Embassy officials interviewed there is almost unanimous agreement that the Privacy Act is complex, difficult to understand, and confusing.  Accordingly, they believe, that regular guidance is required to guarantee proper implementation.

Much of the confusion over these two acts results from the sometimes conflicting principal purposes for which each was enacted. The Privacy Act guarantees the privacy of public records maintained on an individual and limits access, except for the concerned party, to these records by other individuals and government agencies. The Freedom of Information  Act guarantees an individual access to records pertinent to the operations of the Federal Government but safeguards the privacy of Individuals cited in those records.

-Initial State Department guidance on the Privacy Act provided to the U.S. Embassy in Guyana was so highly technical and legalistic that it had little if any practical value, a problem compounded by subsequent communications. It was not until November 18, 1977, almost 3 years after the Privacy Act became law, that the Embassy was provided with what could be regarded as practical guidance. (For further elaboration see Appendix III-G-3.) However, even that communication contained the following prefatory comment: "Due to its rapid passage by Congress in December 1974 without hearings, less than the usual legislative history exists to guide executive departments in interpreting it  * * *."  Available at that time was a 1,500-page volume, "Legislative History of the Privacy Act of 1974," which incorporated committee reports, markup sessions, excerpts from floor debate and other pertinent source materials.

-In day-to-day operations and application, the Privacy Act impacts more on the State Department's consular section than on its diplomatic officers.

- Given the confusion surrounding the Privacy Act and the lack of practical and understandable guidance, it appears that Embassy consular officers in Guyana found the act difficult to implement properly. In contrast, most of their Washington counterparts, in both the political and consular sections of the Department, did not perceive the Embassy's problems and felt the guidance provided was adequate.

-Also contributing to those officials' ability to effectively implement. the Privacy Act, vis-a-vis the People's Temple, was the understanding they held that as a religious organization People's Temple merited added protection under the act. Disregarding for now the question of whether or not People's Temple was a religion, few of the officials knew that the act's prohibition on maintaining records describing the exercise of the first amendment rights also provides an exception for matters pertinent to law enforcement activities. Further, there appeared to be little general awareness among State Department personnel of other exemptions provided in both the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act from mandatory agency disclosure of information.

-The legal recourse Jones and People's Temple had under the Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act to obtain Embassy cables had the chilling effect on Embassy personnel of making their communications to the State Department on People's Temple less candid than they might have otherwise been. That effect was reinforced when the Embassy learned on December 2, 1977, that People's Temple had in fact filed a total of 26 actions under the Privacy Act for documents relating to specified People's Temple members. As a byproduct of these restraints it is reasonable to conclude, that the Embassy's inhibitions to more candidly and accurately report their impressions of the true situation in Jonestown ultimately influenced the State Department's ability to more effectively brief the Ryan Codel. Also not to be discounted is the strong possibility that, knowing the law and the effect it could produce, Jones used the legal claim actions as a tactic in order to achieve the very effect it did.

-Overall, many State Department officials appeared to be highly aware of the civil and/or criminal penalty provisions of both acts. That fact reinforced their perceived image of both acts as threatening and troublesome in that failure to comply could present them with serious personal legal problems. In turn, that thought made them doubly cautious in their dealings with Peoples Temple.

H. Role and Performance of the U.S. Department of State

The role and performance, of the State Department in this matter was the central issue earmarked for investigation in Chairman Zablocki's mandate to the Staff Investigative Group. The points of reference surrounding that issue, span 4 years and are complex and many. (For further elaboration, see Appendix III-H-1 in classified version only.) Given this reality, a major part of the investigation was devoted to this aspect of the issue. The following conclusions and findings based an evidence gathered are:

-The U.S. Embassy in Guyana did not demonstrate adequate initiative, sensitive reaction to, and appreciation of progressively mounting indications of highly irregular and illegal activities in Jonestown. The Embassy's one attempt to confront the situation and affect a solution did not occur until June 1978. Essentially embodying what could at best be described ass the Embassy's heightened suspicion of problems with People's Temple, the. effort was made in the form of a cable (Log 126) to the State Department requesting permission to approach the Guyanese Goverment and "request that the government exercise normal administrative jurisdiction over the community, particularly to insure that all of its residents are informed and understand that they are subject to the laws and authority of the Government, of Guyana * * *." The State Department, failing to detect any linkage between Log 126 and the then recent defection of Temple member Debbie Blakey and other incidents, rejected the request in a terse cable (Log 130) because, such an overture "could be construed by some as U.S. Government interference." (Debbie Blakey defected from the People's Temple in Georgetown, Guyana on May 12, 1978, with the assistance of U.S. Embassy officers Richard McCoy and Daniel Weber. Prior to her departure, to the United States, she submitted a written statement to the Embassy warning, among other things, of the possibility of a mass suicide in Jonestown.)

-The Department's negative response to Log 126 had the net effect of reinforcing the Embassy's already cautious attitude in all dealings with the People's Temple. Despite the fact that an affirmative response was anticipated, the Embassy surprisingly made no effort to challenge the Department's negative decision. Equally surprising was the Department's failure to contact the Ambassador and determine what specifically triggered his request. Testimony from Department witnesses indicates that the lack of specificity in Log 126 was the primary reason for the negative response in Log 130. Such specificity (e.g., Blakey defection) was deliberately avoided, according to the Ambassador, because of Privacy Act considerations. The upshot of this exchange was a lamentable breakdown in communication with neither side making any further efforts to discuss or follow up on the matter.

Mitigating factors were present which require acknowledgment. For example, it is understandable that the Embassy did not have an investigative or judicial function. It also felt compelled to abide by U.S. laws as well as strict State Department rules and regulations while simultaneously respecting the hospitality of Guyana. Embassy personnel were also faced with the challenge of trying to remain objective in the face of two opposing groups of Americans often presenting contradictory stories; a factor reinforced by numerous letters, articles, and documents reflecting equally pro and con dimensions on Jones and the People's Temple. Out of that balance the Embassy concluded only that People's Temple prior to November 18, 1978, was a "controversial" or "unusual" group.

-Nevertheless, absent in the Embassy's dealings with People's Temple were the vital elements of common sense and an honest and healthy skepticism. Despite the acknowledged handicaps under which it worked the Embassy could have exerted sounder overall judgment and a more aggressive posture. One important result of such an effort would have been more accurate and straightforward reporting on the People's Temple situation which, in turn, could have given the State Department a stronger and wider base on which to draw in briefing Representative Ryan and his staff. In this connection, the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act, each of which was discussed in a previous section, played important roles.

-It is proven beyond doubt that Jones staged a show for selective visitors to Jonestown which made it difficult to get a realistic and accurate picture of what was actually happening there. The ability of the Embassy to break through this facade was severely hampered by several factors. First, the Embassy provided in advance to People's Temple, the names of most but not all of the individuals who were to be interviewed by visiting consular officers. That practice allowed Jones to rehearse those people on what to say and how to act.  Second, such "staging" practices were greatly facilitated by the limited time spent in Jonestown by visiting U.S. Embassy officials-an average of 5-6 hours on four different occasions between August 30, 1977, and November 7, 1978.

-In conducting normal consular activities in Jonestown and in other interactions with People's Temple, Embassy officials were restricted by constitutionally mandated safeguards prohibiting interference with free exercise of religious beliefs and with legally sanctioned religious organizations. Recognizing that this issue is not within the direct purview of the committee's investigation, we nevertheless note (as observed earlier) that many People's Temple, members were originally motivated less by religious considerations than by a general social idealism. In addition, it is clear that People's Temple had little specific dimension or few surface trappings which would have made it a "church."

-There was a laxness in State Department procedures for distributing certain important documents relative to People's Temple, thereby inhibiting the opportunity for taking appropriate action. Chief among these was the U.S. Customs Service report on possible gun shipments to Jonestown. Others include the April 10, 1978, affidavit by Yolanda D. A. Crawford, a People's Temple defector, describing beatings and abuses in Jonestown; the affidavit signed in May 1978 by Debbie Blakey, another People's Temple defector, describing suicide rehearsals and other serious charges; and finally the New West magazine article of August 1, 1977, which exposed Jones. A wider awareness of these and similar materials would have significantly enhanced the State Department's ability to evaluate the situation. As a reflection of the problem it is interesting to note that a number of State Department officials interviewed readily volunteered the observation that prior to his trip to Guyana "Mr. Ryan knew more about People's Temple and Jonestown than we did."

-State Department organization and day-to-day operations created a distinction between its consular activities and its diplomatic responsibilities. Inadequate coordination between those two functions led to a situation in which matters involving People's Temple were regarded almost exclusively as consular. Despite mounting indications that the People's Temple issue was spilling over into the United States-Guyana diplomatic area, the mentality persisted of relegating it to the consular side.

-In the area of crisis management following the tragedy of November 18 the State Department and Embassy performed with distinction. Particularly praiseworthy in this regard were the brave and dedicated efforts of Richard Dwyer in aiding and providing leadership under trying circumstances to survivors of the Port Kaituma shooting. Equally admirable were the Department's and Embassy's efforts in evacuating the wounded, providing assistance to others, and keeping Washington officials adequately informed of developments. Also commendable was the competent and efficient work of Department of Defense personnel in assisting the wounded and others and returning them to the United States.

-As to allegations that a female member of People's Temple in Guyana had engaged in a sexual liaison with former U.S. Consul Richard McCoy and had made tape recordings of their sexual activities in an attempt to compromise McCoy, it is our firm judgment, based on our findings, that such allegations are false. The woman in question has in fact testified and signed an affidavit categorically denying all such charges. She further stated that, "To the best of my knowledge, no member of People's Temple engaged in any sexual activity with Richard A. McCoy" and that the People's Temple relationship with McCoy was one of "mistrust and strained discussion though not openly hostile." Nor is there any evidence to indicate that any other person affiliated with the, U.S. Embassy in Guyana had at any time been compromised by the People's Temple.

I. Involvement of the Government of Guyana

On the issue of People's Temple involvement with the Government of Guyana, the Staff Investigative Group renders the following incomplete findings (for further elaboration, see Appendix 111-I in classified version only):

-There is evidence of a strong working relationship between the People's Temple and some officials of the Government of Guyana, especially in the areas of customs and immigration. It is obvious that a special privileged status allowed People's Temple to bring items into Guyana outside of the usual customs procedures, often with cursory inspection at best. Many shipments were inspected perfunctorily or not at all. It is likely that People's Temple brought large sums of money and guns into Guyana in suitcases and false-bottom crates as a result of such customs inspections. As a matter of fact, some of these concerns were expressed by Guyanese officials.

-Guyanese immigration procedures were also compromised to the advantage of People's Temple on several occasions, chiefly in two key areas. First, People's Temple members were able to facilitate entry of their own members or inhibit the exit of defectors by having access to customs areas at Timehri Airport in Georgetown closed to all other citizens. Second, clearly arbitrary decisions were made to curtail the visas and expedite the exit of individuals regarded as opponents of People's Temple. Only upon the strenuous efforts of the U.S. Embassy were some of these decisions ultimately reversed and then at the last minute.

-There are in the investigative record repeated charges of a sexual liaison between People's Temple member Paula Adams and Laurence Mann, Guyana's Ambassador to the United States. It has been reported that Ms. Adams made tape recordings of her sexual encounters with Mann. Transcripts of some of those tapes were apparently made for Mr. Jones and periodically turned over to high officials in the Guyanese Government.

-There is also evidence, incomplete and inconclusive, that unknown officials of the Guyanese Government may have taken action to influence the outcome of the stolen custody case proceedings in the Guyanese court system.

-Testimony from some witnesses suggest that support extended to the People's Temple by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Development Ptolemy Reid was born of an ideological compatibility with and endorsement of the Temple's Socialist philosophy. While such support was exploited in the sense that it had the ultimate effect of furthering People's Temple objectives, it did not appear to be generated for illegal reasons.

NOTE - In reference to these findings regarding the relationship of the Government of Guyana to the People's Temple, the Staff Investigative Group was precluded from confirming or dispelling various allegations by the refusal of the Guyanese Government, to meet and talk with the Group, per Chairman Zablocki's requests of March 2 and 16,1979. (See Appendix II-E-1.) Consequently, to our regret, some of the findings noted above must remain partial and incomplete. There is no doubt in our mind, however, that

our inability to interview Guyanese Government officials leaves this report with a conspicuous void.

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